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1. Reference Materials 
A The most comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of federal public 
lands law is GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & RoBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 
PuBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, published by Clark Boardman 
Callaghan and regularly updated. This talk draws extensively from this 
excellent work. 
B. A useful summary of federal public lands law is Marla E. Mansfield, A 
Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REv. 801 (1993) 
II. Scope 
A This talk deals with federal public lands. (State lands are a separate 
subject not addressed here.) 
1. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Lands: approximately 175 
million acres in the eleven far-western states (Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming). Principal charter for administration 
of BLM lands is the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701- 1784. 
2. National Forests: approximately 140 million acres in the eleven 
far-western states. Principal charters are the Forest Service 
Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473 - 482 (partially repealed 
1976); Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 
528 - 531; National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1600 - 1614. 
3. Other federal lands (National Parks, Monuments, and Recreation 
Areas, National Wildlife Refuges, Department of Defense, etc.): 
approximately 50 million acres in the eleven far-western states. 
B. This talk will concentrate on laws affecting BLM lands and National 
Forests. As used in this talk, "public lands" means BLM lands and 
National Forests. However, some of the material here would also apply 
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to National Parks, Monuments, and Recreation Areas and National 
Wildlife Refuges. 
C. "Federal enclaves," such as military bases, are a special subject that will 
not be dealt with here. For a discussion of federal enclaves, see G. 
COGGINS & R. GLICKSMAN, supra, § 30.03[2]. 
III. Issues 
A. What is the division of decisionmaking authority over public lands 
between federal, and statellocal governments? This issue can recur at 
three levels: 
1. Constitutional: How does the federal constitution divide public 
lands authority between the federal government and the states? 
(N.B. - The federal constitution makes no reference to local 
governments; local governments derive their authority from the 
states.) 
2. Statutory: Of the constitutional authority given to the federal 
government, how much, if any, has been left or delegated to the 
state or local governments, explicitly or implicitly, by federal 
statutes or federal inaction? 
3. Administrative: To what extent, if any, may the federal executive 
branch delegate its statutory authority to state or local entities? 
B. What constitutional or statutory direction is there as to the interests 
(national, state, local) to be served in public lands decisionmaking? 
Note that this is a separate question from the question ofthe division 
of power. For example, Congress might give decisionmaking power over 
an issue to the federal Secretary of the Interior, yet instruct the 
Secretary to give primary consideration to local interests in exercising 
that power. Or the Secretary might, by regulation, establish local public 
lands councils, yet in the same regulation instruct those councils to 
consider national as well as local interests. 
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IV. Constitutional Allocation of Power Over Public Lands 
A. Property Clause (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2): 
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States ... 
Note that this is a grant of authority to Congress that is separate from, 
and in addition to, the powers enumerated in Article I. Thus, legislation 
under the Property Clause need not be justified under the Commerce 
Clause or other Article I authority. 
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Property Clause. 
The overwhelming weight of Supreme Court authority holds that the 
Property Clause gives Congress total authority over the management of 
the federal public lands. See Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property 
Clause Doctrine, 63 Den. L.J. 495 (1986). A couple of examples: 
1. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911): "The United 
States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its 
property may be used." 
2. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976): "[W]e have 
repeatedly observed that 'the power over the public lands thus 
entrusted to Congress is without limitations.' '" In short, 
Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a 
legislature over the public domain." 
C. Attempts during the "sagebrush rebellion" of the 1970s and 1980s to 
assert constitutional state ownership or control of federal public land 
failed. See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Nevada ex reI. Nevada State Board of Agriculture v. United States, 512 
F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981). For a discussion of the "sagebrush 
rebellion," see John Leshy, Unravelling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Who 
Should Control the Public Lands?, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980). 
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D. More recent attempts by counties to assert control over federal public 
lands are likely to fail similarly. See Scott W. Reed, The County 
Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 
525 (1994). For a contrary view, see Comment, The "Wise Use" 
Movement: The Constitutionality of Local Action on Federal Lands 
Under the Preemption Doctrine, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 631 (1984). 
E. A state trial court in Idaho recently struck down a county ordinance 
that purported to assert county control over management of federal 
public lands. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, No. CV 93-
9955 (1st Dist., Boundary Co., Idaho, Jan. 27, 1994). The decision is 
currently under appeal. 
F. Professor Coggins has succinctly summarized the situation: "This 
debate is unavailing because the courts have declared without 
reservation that the Property Clause means what it says: Congress has 
unfettered discretion to do what it will with federal lands and 
resources." G. COGGINS & R. GLICKSMAN, supra, § 3.03[3]. 
G. Do other constitutional provisions limit federal control over public 
lands? The most popular candidate is the "takings" clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. However, despite the recent western frenzy over "takings", 
the clause has extremely limited applicability to public lands. 
1. To be entitled to compensation for a "taking," a claimant must 
establish a private property interest that has been taken. 
2. Private property interests in federal lands exist only where they 
have been explicitly created by Congress or under Congressional 
authority. 
3. The most plausible candidates for private property interests in 
federal lands are mining claims and mineral leases. Nonetheless, 
attempts to assert "takings" related to mining claims and mineral 
leases have so far been unsuccessful. For a summary of the 
cases, see G. COGGINS & R. GLICKSMAN, supra, § 3.04[3][c]. 
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4.. There is no private property interest in the availability of federal 
public livestock forage or timber. United States v. Fuller, 409 
U.S. 488 (1973); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F. 2d 745 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
5. While water rights may be compensable private property 
interests, a water right cannot be used to turn a related public 
land use, such as livestock grazing, into a compensable private 
property interest. Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148 (9th 
Cir. 1967). 
V. Is there any constitutional direction concerning the weight to be given national 
versus local interests in the management of the public lands? 
A. None in the text of the property clause. 
B. In Light, the Supreme Court stated: "All the public lands of the nation 
are held in trust for the people of the whole country . ... Congress may 
establish a forest reserve [National Forest] "for what it decides to be 
national and public purposes." 220 U.S. at 536-37 (emphasis added). 
Do these words suggest a constitutional "public trust doctrine" for 
federal public lands, similar to the public trust doctrine applied to the 
states? See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); 
Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269 (1980). 
C. The public trust doctrine has been successfully invoked to block state 
giveaways of certain state lands. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 
146 U.S. 387 (1892); Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. 
Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). But 
giveaways of federal land (statehood grants, homesteads, etc.) are a 
tradition as old as the nation. 
D. Even if a federal public trust responsibility exists, it may not be 
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judicially enforceable. Light: "[I]t is not for the courts to say how that 
trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine." 220 
U.S. at 536. 
VI. How much of its constitutional power over public lands has Congress left or 
delegated to the states, implicitly or explicitly? 
A. Although Congress has plenary power over the public lands, state law 
applies on the public lands when Congress has not preempted it. 
Omachaevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). 
B. State law may be preempted by express Congressional declaration, 
because it directly conflicts with federal law, because it runs contrary to 
the purposes of federal law, or because Congress has "occupied the 
field." For a comprehensive discussion of preemption in public lands 
law, see G. COGGINS & R. GLICKSMAN, supra, § 4.03. 
C. Most "ordinary" state civil and criminal law unrelated to natural 
resources applies on the public lands because it has not been preempted. 
D. With respect to several natural resources on public lands, Congress has 
asserted its constitutional authority, to the exclusion of state law: 
1. Livestock grazing. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S,C. §§ 315 - 315-0-
1; National Forest Grazing Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 580c - 5801; FLPMA, 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753; Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1901 - 1904. 
2. Timber. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897; NFMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1600 - 1614. 
3. Coal, oil, and gas. Mineral Leasing Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 181 - 287. 
E. With respect to some other resources, Congress has left substantial 
control to the states: 
1. Water. Congress has acquiesced to the appropriation of water on 
public lands pursuant to state law. Mining Act of 1866; Desert 
Land Act of 1877. 
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2. Hunting and fishing. Congress has allowed the states to 
authorize and regulate hunting and fishing on BLM and Forest 
Service Lands. See MUSYA, 16 U.S.C. § 528; FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1732(b). 
F. Even where Congress leaves or delegates control to the states, it always 
retains the power to selectively reassert its authority. For example, 
1. although Congress has left many wildlife management functions 
to the states, including the regulating of hunting and fishing, 
Congress has forbidden the killing or. capture of wild horses and 
burros on the public lands. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and 
Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 - 1340; See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
supra. 
2. although Congress has generally left the control of water 
resources to the states, Congress has implicitly or explicitly 
reserved federal water rights on several categories of public lands. 
See generally G. COGGINS & R. GLICKSMAN, supra, § 4.04[4]. 
G. In the BLM and Forest Service planning processes, Congress has 
required coordination with, and consideration of, state and local land 
use plans. 
1. BLM. FLPMA's planning provisions include the following 
requirements: 
In the development and revision of land use plans, the 
Secretary shall 
(8) provide for compliance with applicable pollution control 
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other 
pollution standards or implementation plans; and 
(9) to the extent consistent with the laws governing the 
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use 
inventory, planning and management activities of or for 
such lands with the land use planning and management 
programs of other Federal departments and agencies and 
of the States and local governments within which the lands 
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eire located . .. and of or for Indian tribes by, among other 
things, considering the policies of approved State and tribal 
land resource management programs. 
and shall provide for meaningful public involvement of 
State and local government officials, both elected and 
appointed, in the development of land use programs, land 
use regulations, and land use decisions for public lands .. 
Land use plans of the Secretary under this section shall be 
consistent with State and local plans to the maximum 
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the 
purposes of this Act. 
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (emphasis added). 
2. The Supreme Court has held that the first of the above provisions 
(8) allows a state to impose an environmental permit requirement 
on a mine on federal public land. California Coastal Commission 
v. Granite Rock Company, 480 U.S. 572 (1987). 
3. The second provision does not allow states or counties to directly 
impose their land use plans on federal public lands. Granite 
Rock. But it does provide strong direction for the BLM to 
accommodate state and county plans in its plans. 
4. Forest Service. The NFMA requires that Forest Service land use 
plans be "coordinated with the land and resource management 
planning processes of State and local governments and other 
Federalagencies." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). 
5. These federal statutory provisions provide a much more solid 
basis for state and county involvement in federal public lands 
management than do arguments based on the constitution or on 
state sovereignty. 
VII. What direction has Congress given the BLM and the Forest SerVice regarding 
the interests to be served in the management of the public lands? 
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A. Congress has instructed both the Forest Service and the BLM to follow 
the principle of "multiple use." FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a); NFMA, 16 
U.S.C. § 1604(e)(I). Congress gave each agency its own definition of 
"multiple use," but the two definitions are nearly identical. 
B. The following is the definition Congress gave the BLM: 
The term "multiple use" means the management of the 
public lands so that they are utilized in the combination 
that will best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people; . ..; the use of some land for less than 
all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse 
resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs 
of future generations for renewable and non-renewable 
resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, 
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural 
scenic, scientific and historical values; and harmonious and 
coordinated management of the various resources without 
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality 
of the environment[,] with consideration being given to the 
relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the 
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic 
return or the greatest unit output. 
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
C. The nearly identical definition for the Forest Service is in the Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 531(a). 
D. The Ninth Circuit has stated that this definition of multiple use 
"breathes discretion at every pore." Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 
806 (9th Cir. 1979). But Professor Coggins has argued persuasively that 
the definition of does contain judicially enforceable standards. George 
C. Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The 
Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield" for Public Land 
Management, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 229 (1982). 
E. The definition of multiple use requires that the public lands be managed 
in the manner that will "best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people." This requirement suggests that, in case of conflict, 
9 
national needs should prevail over local needs. But national needs 
include local needs; so local needs should not be neglected. Nonetheless, 
a decision or policy that arbitrarily elevates local interests above non-
local interests would violate the definition. 
F. Similarly, a policy or decision that fails to give "consideration ... to the 
relative values of the resources" would violate the definition of multiple 
use. "The values in question [must] be informedly and rationally taken 
into balance." Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,292, 20,293 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
G. Forest Service planning regulations require the Forest Service to 
evaluate the "suitability" of particular areas for uses such as grazing or 
timbering. The regulations' definition of "suitability" implements the 
statutory definition of multiple use: 
Suitability; The appropriateness of applying certain 
resource management practices to a particular area of 
land, as determined by an analysis of the economic and 
environmental consequences and the alternative uses 
foregone. 
36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (emphasis added). 
H. The following are examples of BLM or Forest Service policies or 
practices that would violate the definition of multiple use: 
1. Authorizing timber harvests in order to keep a local mill 
operating without determining whether there are other resources, 
more valuable from a national perspective, that are being 
damaged by the timber harvests. 
2. Rejecting a "no-grazing" alternative for a grazing allotment on the 
grounds that the rancher must be kept in business, without 
balancing the economic importance of the ranch against the 
environmental consequences of the grazing. See Joseph M. Feller, 
What is Wrong With the BLM's Management of Livestock Grazing 
on the Public Lands, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 566-67 (1994). 
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3. Rejecting a "no-grazing" alternative on the grounds that multiple 
use requires that grazing be allowed, or that grazing is an 
"historic use." 
I. Case law applying the definition of "multiple use" is extremely limited. 
However, an administrative law judge in the Department of the Interior 
recently held that the BLM violated the definition when it authorized 
cattle grazing in environmentally sensitive canyons without evaluating 
the environmental consequences and "making a reasoned and informed 
decision as to whether grazing in those canyons is in the public 
interest." National Wildlife Federation v. BLM, No. UT-06-91-1 (U.S. 
Dep't of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Hearings Div., 
Dec. 20, 1993). The decision is currently under appeal to the Interior 
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 
VIII. What authority, if any, does the executive branch of the federal government 
have to delegate power to state or local bodies? 
A. Through FLPMA, MUSYA, NFMA, and other statutes, Congress has 
vested enormous authority over the public lands in the Secretary of the 
Interior (and his sub-agency, the BLM) and the Secretary of Agriculture 
(and his sub-agency, the Forest Service). May these executive agencies 
in turn delegate some or all of their decisionmaking power to state or 
local entities? 
B. FLPMA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to establish "advisory 
councils." 43 U.S.C. § 1739. 
1. 10 - 15 members appointed by the Secretary "from among persons 
who are representative of the various major citizens' interests 
concerning the problems related to land use planning or the 
management of the public lands located within the area for which 
an advisory council is established." 43 U.S.C. § 1739(a). 
2. The statute does not specify the size of the geographic area to be 
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covered by an advisory council; nor does it specifY that the 
members shall be residents of the area. 
3. The councils "may furnish advice" to the Secretary; they have no 
decisionmaking authority. 
4. In addition, FLPMA mandated continuance of "grazing advisory 
boards" consisting solely of ranchers, but the FLPMA's authority 
for such boards expired at the end of 1985. 43 U.S.C. § 1753(f). 
C. There is no authorization in FLPMA, NFMA, or other public lands 
statutes for delegation of decisionmaking authority from the federal 
executive branch to state or local governments or to appointed state or 
local councils. 
D. Within the federal agencies, delegation of authority without explicit . 
statutory authorization is routine. BLM authority is delegated to State 
Directors, District Managers, and Area Managers. Forest Service 
authority is delegated to Regional Foresters, Forest Supervisors, and 
District Rangers. Such delegation is required by practical necessity. 
E. Delegation of decisionmaking authority outside the agencies would likely 
be held contrary to Congressional intent that the agencies manage the 
public lands. It may also violate the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA). See infra IX.D 
F. The Reagan/Watt administration attempted to delegate a substantial 
portion of the BLM's range management authority to ranchers. The 
administration established by regulation a system of Cooperative 
Management Agreements (CMAs) that would have allowed selected 
ranchers to "manage livestock grazing on [their] allotment[s] as they 
determine appropriate." 48 Fed. Reg. 21,823-24 (1983). A federal 
district court struck down the CMA program as a "naked violation of 
[the government's] affirmative duties under the Taylor Grazing Act, 
FLPMA, and PRIA [the Public Rangelands Improvement Act]." Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 868 (E.D. 
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Cal. 1985). The court emphasized that Congress intended for the BLM, 
not the ranchers, to prescribe range management practices. 618 F. 
Supp. at 868-871. 
IX. Federal Advisory Committee Act (F ACA) 
A. Advisory councils set up by the BLM or the Forest Service are subject 
to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 
U.S.C. Appendix 2 §§ 1 - 15. 
B. FACA applies to all "advisory committees." "Advisory committee" is 
very broadly defined. See 5 U.S.C. Appendix 2 § 3(2). It would include 
various advisory committees and teams proposed in the administration's 
Rangeland Reform 94 proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,314, 14,319-21, 14,328-
29, 14,342-43 (March 25, 1944). 
C. In FACA, Congress declared that "new advisory committees should be 
established only when they are determined to be essential and their 
number should be kept to the minimum necessary." 5 U.S.C. Appendix 
2 § 2(a). 
D. "[A]dvisory committees shall be utilized solely for advisory functions. 
Determinations of action to be taken and policy to be expressed ... shall 
be made solely by the President or an officer of the Federal 
Government." 5 U.S.C. Appendix 2 § 9(b). 
E. F ACA imposes numerous procedural requirements on advisory 
committees, including the following: 
1. Meetings must be open to the public. 5 U.S.C. Appendix 2 § 
10(a)(1). 
2. Notices of meetings must be published in the Federal Register. 
Id. § 10(a)(2). 
3. "Interested persons shall be permitted to attend, appear before, 
or file statements with any advisory committee," subject to 
"reasonable rules and regulation." Id. § 10(a)(3). 
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4. Papers "which were made available to or prepared for or by" an 
advisory committee must also be made available to the public for 
inspection and copying. Id. § lO(b). 
5. Minutes must be kept. Id. § 10(c). 
6. There must be a designated agency officer or employee who will 
attend every meeting. Id. § 10(e). 
7. Transcripts of committee meetings must be made available at 
cost. Id. § ll(a). 
X. All public lands decisions, regardless of whether they are made or advised by 
local advisory or consensus groups, must conform to a number of federal 
statutory requirements, including, but not limited to: 
A. Enviromnental analysis, disclosure, and consideration of alternatives 
required by NEPA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370d. 
B. Consultation and substantive protection required by the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 - 1544. 
C. Certification, permits, and conformance with water quality standards 
required by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 - 1387. 
All public lands decisions are also subject to the general requirement of 
administrative law that the responsible agency provide an explanation of the reasons 
for its decision and how that decision satisfies applicable statutory requirements. 
See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962); 
Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co., 112 I.B.L.A. 365, 368 (1990). 
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